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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY DEAN TUCKEY, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEBRA A. TUCKEY (TREVIZO), 
Defendant/Respondent, 
FRANK TUCKEY and MARY TUCKEY, 
husband and wife, 
Intervenors/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 17189 
This is a custody dispute between the mother and 
the paternal grandparents of two children born to Larry Dean 
Tuckey and Debra A. Tuckey. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE TRIAL COURT 
This matter was tried to the Third District Court, 
Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding. The Court maintained 
custody of the children in the Defendant mother and denied 
the petition of Intervenor grandparents. Intervenors made 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a variety of post-trial motions which resulted in Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Judgment 
awarding custody of the children to Defendant was not 
altered. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the District 
Court's Judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent adopts the facts as set out in Appel-
lant's Brief with the following exceptions. 
1. The Petition to Intervene of Frank and Mary 
Tuckey was granted on February 15, 1979 as was Intervenors' 
Motion for Temporary Custody of the minor children, the 
Defendant indicating to the Court that she had no objection 
since the Intervenors had told her she could have the children 
back in her custody as soon as she was able to get back on 
her feet. R. 197. 
2. In addition to the evaluation of Intervenors 
and the evaluation of Defendant performed by Ms. Denise 
Taft, Mrs. Lela Patteson of the Vernal office of the Utah 
Division of Family Services filed a report with the court 
regarding the home conditions in Defendant's residence in 
-2-
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Lapoint, Utah and indicated the house was clean and appro-
priate for the care of young children. R. 190-191. 
3. Defendant has recently remarried and resides 
in a mobile home at Lapoint, Utah, adjacent to the mobile 
home of her mother and near other relatives who assist her 
in the care of her children. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE CORRECT 
STANDARD IN AWARDING CUSTODY AND ITS 
DECISION SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
This Court has established a stringent standard of 
review in cases concerning child custody awards: 
[T]he trial court is given particularly 
broad discretion in the area of child 
custody incident to separation or divorce 
proceedings .... Only where the trial court 
action is so flagrantly unjust as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion should 
the appellate forum interpose its own 
judgment. 
Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510, 511-512 (Utah 1979). 
Appellants have made no showing of any such abuse of dis-
cretion to justify reversal here. 
There are two basic doctrines which courts have 
used to decide custody disputes between the parent and third 
parties - the ''parental right" doctrine, which ordinarily 
-3-
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awards custody to the parent unless he or she is proven 
unfit, and the "best interest of the child" doctrine, which 
looks to the child's welfare regardless of any parental 
rights. However, in Utah, while the "best interests" 
doctrine applies to custody disputes between a mother and a 
father, it is clear that the "parental right" doctrine is 
controlling in custody disputes between a parent and a third 
party. 
It is incorrect to say that either the parental 
right or the best interest doctrine is the modern view, as 
both doctrines are in widespread use. It is also incorrect 
to call either doctrine a better view, as the doctrines are 
merely two ways to reach what would normally be the same 
conclusion. Even courts which apply the best interest 
doctrine in cases such as this give great weight to the idea 
that an important factor in determining the child's best 
interest is the belief the child should normally be with its 
parent rather than its grandparents. Thus, even without 
using a presumption, the courts give great weight to parental 
rights under either theory. See 29 ALR 3rd 366, 390-394. 
In Utah the standard is usually expressed as a 
presumption that the child's welfare will be best served in 
the custody of its natural parent[s). This was the basis of 
-4-
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the decision in Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P.2d 97 
(1946), where this court stated, "we have repeatedly held 
that there is a presumption that it will be in the best 
interest and welfare of the child to be raised under the 
care, custody and control of its natural parent. Such a 
presumption is recognized by most courts ... " and, at 102-
103: 
We conclude that the determining consi-
deration in cases of this kind is: 
What will be for the best interest and 
welfare of the child? That in determining 
this question there is a presumption 
that it would be for the best interest 
and welfare of the child to be reared 
under the care, custody and control of 
its natural parent; that this presumption 
is not overcome unless from all the 
evidence the trier of facts is satisfied 
that the welfare of the child requires 
that it be awarded to someone other than 
its natural parent. Thus the ultimate 
burden of proof on this question is al-
ways in favor of the parent and against 
the other person. (emphasis added) 
The same presumption is also recognized in Hardcastle 
v. Hardcastle, 118 Utah 192, 221 P.2d 883 (1950), although 
it was not applicable there because of a contrary finding 
made by the divorce court awarding custody to the grand-
mother on an earlier occasion. This is in contrast to the 
present case in which the divorce court awarded custody to 
the mother in the first instance. Hardcastle is also 
-5-
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instructive in connection with the burden of going forward 
of each of the parties herein: 
The mother is conceded to be a fit and 
proper person to have the care and custody 
of her child and unless her past conduct 
brands her as unfit or forfeits her right 
to claim her own flesh and blood, there is 
no good reason why her opportunity to become 
a real mother to her daughter should be 
longer delayed. 
221 P.2d at 889. 
The application of the best interest test there is really 
only a slight variation of the parental right analysis. 
Given the facts of that case and the ultimate award of 
custody to the mother, Defendant should certainly prevail 
herein. 
Over the years this court has recognized and given 
great weight to the parental right presumption, culminating 
in Coffman. In Alley v. Alley, 67 Utah 316, 247 P. 301, 304 
(1926), the court stated that it had "frequently made plain 
that where the parent is morally a fit person to have the 
care and custody of his own offspring, his rights are 
paramount to all others." (emphasis added) In Wallick v. 
Vance, 76 Utah 209, 289 P. 103, 108 (1930), the court 
indicated that "the father as the surviving parent starts 
with a very strong presumption in his favor." This strong 
parental preference has remained in effect to the present 
-6-
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day. See In Interest of Winger, 558 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah 
1976). In this entire line of cases, the parental pre-
ference was overcome only when the evidence showed that the 
parent had abandoned or neglected the child, or forfeited or 
surrendered custody. 
Utah is by no means the only state which adopts 
this view. Although intervenors present a "survey" of 
decisions purporting to use the best interest test, as many 
recent cases from the same and other jurisdictions illustrate 
the continuing vitality of the parental rights doctrine 
across the nation. For example, Nielsen v. Nielsen, 296 
N.W.2d 483 (Neb. 1980) held that the courts may not deprive 
a parent of its superior custody right unless it is affir-
matively shown that such parent is not fit to perform the 
duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited that 
right. The Supreme Court of Nebraska went on to say that 
the right of a parent to the custody of a minor child is not 
lightly to be set aside in favor of more distant relatives 
or unrelated parties. This shows Nebraska enthusiastically 
espousing a parental right theory, contrary to what Inter-
venors' brief would lead the court to believe. In fact, the 
Blanco v. Blanco case, 128 NW.2d 615 (Neb. 1964) cited by 
Intervenors in suppo!t of a best interest test is incorrectly 
cited. In that case the mother was found to have forfeited 
-7-
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her parental rights but the court used nearly identical 
language in expressing the same parental rights doctrine 
that it more recently recognized in Neilsen. The court in 
Blanco cited an even earlier case, Raymond v. Cotner, 175 
Neb. 158, 120 N.W2d 892 (1963) as follows: 
The courts may not properly deprive a 
parent of the custody of a minor child 
unless it is affirmatively shown that 
such parent is unfit to perform the 
duties imposed by the relationship or 
has forfeited that right. 
Nebraska seems to clearly adopt the parental right position. 
In Lewis v. Lewis, 269 So.2d 919 (Ga. App. 1980), 
the court held that in the contest between one or both 
parents and a third party, unfitness must be shown by 
evidence and found to exist before either parent can be 
deprived of custody. This position is also apparent in 
Ellerbe v. Hooks, 416 A.2d 512, 513-514 (Penn. 1980), where 
the court said that the parent-child relationship should be 
considered of importance in determining a suitable custody 
arrangement because parents have a "prima facia right to 
custody" which may be forfeited only if "convincing reasons 
appear that the child's best interest will be served by an 
award to the third party. Thus, even before the proceedings 
start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard to 
the parent's side." The Holschuh v. Holland-Moritz case, 
281 A.2d 129 (Penn. 1971) cited in Intervenors' brief, seems 
-8-
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more an application of a parental right doctrine than a 
decision based on a strict best interest test in that state 
as well. Intervenors' complain that requiring them to prove 
the natural mother unfit is too heavy a burden. It is a 
heavy burden, but in line with the overwhelming majority of 
courts, this burden is rightfully on one who would disrupt 
the family unit. 
A New York court has recently added another 
dimension to establishing the correct parameters of the 
discussion here. Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (NY 
1976) recently held: 
Neither decisional rule nor statute can 
displace a fit parent because someone 
else could do a 'better job' of raising 
the child in the view of the court, so 
long as the parent or parents have not 
forfeited their rights by surrender, 
abandonment, unfitness, persisting neglect 
or other extraordinary circumstance .... 
[E)xcept when disqualified or displaced 
by extraordinary circumstances, parents 
are generally best qualified to care for 
their own children and therefore entitled 
to do so. Indeed the courts and the law 
would, under existing constitutional princi-
ples, be powerless to supplant parents except 
for grievous cause or necessity. 
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). 
Over and over again, our courts have emphasized the existence 
and constitutional dimension of the parents' primary legal 
rights to their child.· A number of United States Supreme 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Court cases, including Stanley, have discussed such rights 
as marriage, establishing a home, and rearing children as 
fundamental rights to be accorded the greatest sanctity. 
The prevailing rule then, in a custody dispute 
between a third party and a parent, is that the parent will 
prevail unless clearly shown to be unfit, and there is a 
presumption that he or she is fit. A law journal author 
stated it this way. "Thus, in custody cases between persons 
with legal rights in the child, the best interests of the 
child prevail, which ordinarily amounts to a choice between 
them unless one or both is unfit. In custody disputes 
between a parent and a third party, it might be said either 
that the presumption of fitness of the parent is stronger or 
that the best interest of the child will weigh less heavily, 
which is the other side of the coin." 39 U of Detroit L.J. 
347 at 356-358 (1962). As shown above, this is clearly the 
position taken by this court in the past. The decision 
reached by the trial court is a correct application of 
previous case law and should be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND CON-
CLUSIONS ARE SUFFICIENT AND SHOULD 
BE UPHELD. 
-10-
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Appellants point to four alleged deficiencies in 
the trial court's findings and conclusions. In their ob-
jections Intervenors confuse their position as argued with 
the court's findings. The two are simply not the same. 
First, the Court removed a proposed reference to an initial 
evaluation performed by Ms. Denise Taft. Since the court 
did not base its conclusions or judgment on Ms. Taft's 
testimony, the fact that she gave testimony and made a 
contrary recommendation is not a material factual issue 
which must be resolved by the findings. The court is 
obliged to make findings only on such issues. Sorenson v. 
Beers, 614 P.2d 159, 160 (Utah 1980). While Finding No. 6 
is somewhat ambiguous as to what "thereon" refers to, the 
ambiguity is not a sufficient basis for reversal or remand. 
Likewise with Intervenors' second objection, to 
deleting Ms. Taft's supplemental recommendation. Again the 
material facts do not include what Ms. Taft recommended, but 
rather the factual basis for the judge's decision which is 
supported by other findings. In custody proceedings the 
trial court has the discretion to disregard the testimony of 
an expert, since such testimony is in no manner controlling 
on the court. Mecham v. Mecham, 544 P.2d 479, 481 (Utah 
197 5). 
-11-
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Intervenors' third objection is to Finding No. 9. 
The report of Ms. Lela Patteson, DFS worker from Vernal, 
which was adopted by stipulation and referred to by the 
court at R.239, contains the source information about both 
the job market in Vernal and the details of the land purchase. 
Finally, Conclusion of Law Nos. 1 and 2 properly 
state the rule in Utah that parents are entitled to a pre-
sumption of fitness for custody of their children as against 
third parties unless the challenger can present evidence to 
overcome this rebuttable presumption. This the Intervenors 
failed to do. The Conclusions correctly reflect the state 
of the law in this state (See Point I above) and the trial 
court's conclusions regarding the circumstances before him. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
As cited above, in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, this 
court recently reaffirmed a long line of cases extending 
broad discretion to the lower court in child custody cases 
since any decision in this area of law is, of necessity, 
based on a difficult and to some extent subjective evalua-
tion of conflicting evidence as to future behavior of adults 
toward children. In this case there was a great deal of 
conflicting testimony regarding the behavior of various 
-12-
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adults and even of the children themselves and who was or 
was not responsible for those behaviors and even whether it 
was better to live in the city or the country (R. 228) or to 
use Indian or more traditional Anglo-American child rearing 
techniques (R. 218). 
After hearing from both parents and both grand-
mothers, the trial court elected to maintain custody with 
the mother who had been awarded custody in the divorce 
proceeding some years earlier. The court querried the 
children's father as to Respondent's ability to care for and 
discipline the children before the divorce. He testified 
she was able to properly care for the children (R. 224-5) . 
Similarly a state-employed Social Services worker, Ms. Lela 
Patteson, visited Respondent's home and found it to be 
adequately sized and furnished (R. 239) and Respondent and 
her husband able to meet the financial needs of the children. 
Appellants have selected bits and pieces of evidence, 
primarily self-serving, to claim that the weight of evidence 
supports a custody award to them. However, the fairer 
reading of the evidence supports a conclusion that the 
evidence is split and in conflict and it was within the 
discretion of the court.to find that Respondent should 
retain custody. If anything the evidence shows that Re-
spondent has had difficulties in her life and has recently 
-13-
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begun to get back on her feet with the assistance of her 
mother and husband. Certainly receiving assistance from 
one's family is not a basis for losing custody of one's 
children. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court acted within its discretion in 
maintaining custody with Respondent. The legal standard 
used was correct, there is competent evidence among the 
conflicting evidence to support the court's decision and it 
should be upheld. 
DATED this /2.,1],_ day of January, 1981. 
Respectfully submitted, 
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
Attorneys for Respondent 
BRUCE PLENK 
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